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The Western European kingdoms,
600–1000
gu y ha l s a l l
*
Part 1: c.600–800
Change around 600 CE: a military revolution?
Before c.600, Western European military forces were recognisably descended
from the last western Roman armies, as can quickly be demonstrated. Late
Roman troops had sometimes been paid via the delegation of fiscal revenues
and, as earlier, received allotments of land on retirement.1 Their hereditary
service,2 furthermore, exempted them from certain taxes. In the fourth and
fifth centuries a series of military identities evolved, based around oppositions
to traditional civic Roman ideals. These turned on ideas of barbarism,
enhanced by possibly increased recruitment beyond the frontiers and greater
opportunities for non-Roman soldiers to rise to higher command.3 As the
territory effectively governed from Ravenna, the imperial capital, shrank
during the fifth century, and with it the available taxation and recruiting
* I am grateful to the Leverhulme Foundation for the award of a Major Research
Fellowship, which allowed me to work on this chapter. Much of this chapter, especially
the sections on recruitment and organisation, is based upon Guy Halsall, Warfare and
Society in the Barbarian West (London, UCL Press, 2003), which contains most of the
relevant bibliography. Further reference to this work and its bibliography is avoided.
The notes will refer to primary sources and supplementary material.
1 Hugh Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, 350–425 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996);
Douglas Lee, ‘The Army’, in Avril Cameron and Peter Garnsey (eds.), The Cambridge
Ancient History, vol. 13:The Late Empire, A .D . 337–425 (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1998), pp. 211–37; Douglas Lee, War in Late Antiquity: A Social History (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2002); Pat Southern and Karen Dixon, The Late Roman Army
(London, Batsford, 1996); R. S. O. Tomlin, ‘The Army of the Late Empire’, in
John Wacher (ed.) The Roman World (London, Routledge, 1987), pp. 107–23.
2 See, for example, Sulpicius Severus, Life of Martin, 2, Frederick Hoare (trans.), ‘Sulpicius
Severus: The Life of Saint Martin of Tours’, in Thomas Noble and Thomas Head (ed.)
Soldiers of Christ: Saints and Saints’ Lives from Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages
(Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), pp. 1–29.
3 Guy Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West, 376–568 (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 2007), pp. 101–10, and references.
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bases, the enlistment, and political pre-eminence, of warriors from outside
the empire grew further.4
Similarly, post-imperial armies were frequently raised from people claim-
ing a non-Roman identity: Franks in the north and Burgundians in the south-
east of Gaul, Goths in Spain and Italy. Such warriors seem to have been paid,
partly at least, by the delegation of taxation levied on the civic ‘Roman’
population.5 Their lands were tax-exempt and their military responsibilities,
linked to their ethnic identity, seem to have been hereditary. Service was
structured around the life-cycle with young men serving as pueri in the
households of older warriors, royal officers, or the kings themselves.
Successful service led to marriage and the establishment of their own house-
holds. At this age, apparently, ethnic identity was formally acquired. Older
warriors would then serve when summoned, alongside any of their own
young apprentices. Some held posts within the royal administration and
others doubtless continued at the palace, training younger pueri regis. In
some areas, like Aquitaine and possibly southern Italy, military service was
apparently based differently, on land-ownership rather than ethnic identity.
Quite how this related to taxation is unclear.
Before c.600warriors were raised according to kingdom-wide principles of
service, levied by administrative district, commanded by royal officers. The
holding of the relevant offices was generally in the king’s gift, rather than
hereditary. Because, in most regions, the aristocracy relied upon royal favour
or patronage, either for its local pre-eminence or position within the ‘pecking
orders’ of the class, a king could raise the army to impose his will within the
realm. This is very clear fromMerovingian Gaul, but the point appears more
generally applicable. Although later fifth- and sixth-century armies were by
no means regular forces of the old Roman type, they evidently still func-
tioned as independent coercive forces. Thus, it remains perfectly justified to
see these realms as states.
Nevertheless, this situation contained the seeds of change. One was the
common ethnic nature of military service. Ethnicity was not fixed and seems
frequently to have been acquired at the age where a male established
a household. It appears, furthermore, to have been gendered: ethnic identi-
ties are ascribed overwhelmingly to men. However, the social and legal
4 Ibid., pp. 242–83 passim.
5 Walter Goffart, Barbarians and Romans AD 418–585: The Techniques of Accommodation
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980); Walter Goffart, Barbarian Tides: The
Migration Age and the Later Roman Empire (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2006); Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, pp. 422–47.
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attractions of non-Roman ethnicity meant that it became steadily more
common and, by 600, more or less universal among the aristocracy and
free landholding classes in most areas of theWest. Simultaneously, it appears
to have been more universally assigned (to children and women as well as
adult males). Given the frequent tax-exemption of people subject to military
service, this development surely meant the spread of liability for military
duty, and presumably a concomitant inclusion within their ranks of freemen
less able to bear the costs of such service. It probably reduced the amount of
land subject to royal taxation and, through the inheritance of ‘military lands’
by women of non-Roman ethnicity, led to its tenure by people considered
incapable of performing military service. These points alone would probably
have produced significant change in the raising of armies but they constituted
only one group of factors among many, making the decades around 600
a period of intense transformation in Western European society and econ-
omy. Another key development in many regions was a growth in aristocratic
power, vis-à-vis royal, and thus, during the seventh century, we can detect
significant changes in the nature of armies and their levying.
By the mid seventh century it is difficult to see any trace of the post-
imperial means of raising armies. Mention of the ‘men of Mainz’ and the
pagenses of Saintes in a 639 campaign may be the last allusions to old-style
levies based on administrative districts (civitates and pagi).6 Instead, references
to armies take us in two complementary directions. We begin to encounter
‘select’ levies – scarae. Cognate with the English ‘shear’ and ‘share’, the word
implies a band, cut (or sheared) off from the mass.7 The presumed spread of
ethnically based liability for military service would make a levy of the free
population entirely impractical. In the early medieval social and economic
context, armies larger than a few thousand men were unfeasible. The term
‘select’ is unfortunate, though. The immediately post-imperial ‘ethnic’ mili-
tary landowners presumably represented (initially at least) an equally select
body and one imagines that during the sixth century, royal officers – counts,
dukes, and centenarii – had to choose those best suited to serve from steadily
increasing numbers of theoretically eligible men. What changed was not
6 Fredegar IV.87: The Fourth Book of the Chronicle of Fredegar, with its Continuations, trans.
John Wallace-Hadrill (London, Greenwood Press, 1960).
7 This sense is crystal clear in its earliest appearance – Fredegar’s Chronicle, IV.74 (dealing
with Dagobert I’s 631 Thuringian campaign) – where the Frankish force is described as
‘the army of the kingdom of the Austrasians’, plus scarae de electis viris (scarae of chosen
men) from Neustria and Burgundy, under counts and dukes.
guy halsall
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whether or not warriors were drawn from a select group but the means of
selecting them.
How this ‘shearing’ was carried out is suggested by the other prevailing
aspect of seventh-century military organisation: the aristocratic retinue.
Military households existed in the sixth century but they seem to have
dominated seventh-century army composition. Their precise nature appar-
ently also changed. Seventh-century sources widely acknowledge the exis-
tence of freemen dependent upon more powerful fellows, and a class of
aristocrats whose power was fundamentally independent of royal service.
Evidence of more secure tenure of large estates is more easily found; these
lands were used to reward followers. This seems to have meant that, whereas
in the sixth century older warriors performed military service according to
general systems of obligation, in the seventh, even after leaving the age-
group of the pueri, the warrior still served in his lord’s retinue. Across
Western Europe such nobles interposed themselves between the king and
the remainder of the free population. Around 600 the last vestiges of Roman
taxation disappeared, largely because these imposts had passed to estate
owners. Legislation appears concerning the frequent intrusion of magnates
into the operation of royal justice, protecting their ‘satellites’ from sentencing
by judges. Simultaneously, aristocratic dynasties become more visible, fre-
quently monopolising administrative offices. We are some way from heredi-
tary counties or duchies but the detectable sequences of counts from the
same families in particular areas strongly suggest that, although such titles
had little value without the legitimation of royal appointment, these kin-
groups clearly expected that the king would appoint one of their number to
a vacancy.
During the seventh century, therefore, the magnates were seemingly able
to insert themselves into the means of levying the army. When military
forces were required, even if legitimised by royal summons and nominally
employing old ideas of military liability, in practice the local counts would
select or ‘shear off’, from all those theoretically liable for military service, the
most politically and socially important landholders, their allies, and depen-
dents. As the army was a kingdom’s most important political assembly, the
choice of whom to summon and whom to leave behind was a significant
source of power and patronage.What happened in the seventh-centuryWest
might, then, not unreasonably be termed a ‘privatisation’ of the army. I have
distinguished the different means of levying an army by the terms ‘horizon-
tal’ (levied according to a kingdom-wide ‘flat rate’ by royal agents working
within specific royal administrative districts: the sixth-century model) and
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‘vertical’ (raised down chains of dependence within aristocratic estates and
dependencies as in the seventh century); this may yet suffice as a short-hand.
This is very significant in determining how we classify polities in this
period. After c.600, the mustering of armies was increasingly (with temporal
and geographical exceptions) a matter of negotiation between the royal court
and local or regional aristocracies. This in turn made it correspondingly
difficult for a monarch to summon an army to resolve internal difficulties
such as recalcitrant or rebellious noblemen. The army ceased to be an
independent governmental coercive force, profoundly affecting kings’ ability
to harness the surplus of their realms beyond their own private estates. This
emphatically does not imply that these polities were not cohesive or that
kings did not wield considerable authority. Dynastic legitimacy and other
ideological strategies could maintain the royal court as the essential focus of
politics. Nevertheless, without the ability to raise armed forces independently
of regional and local magnates in order to impose their will upon the diverse
localities of their realms, it is unhelpful (against recent historiographical
fashion) to call these kingdoms states.
A significant change in armament occurred at this time. The practice of
burying weapons in graves provides, by early medieval standards, an enor-
mous sample (many thousands of items) of contemporary weaponry,
although unevenly distributed geographically and temporally. Between
c.575 and c.625, several hitherto common items disappear from this record.
In Francia especially, these include the throwing axe (francisca) and the heavy,
iron-shafted barbed javelin (ango). One-handed battle axes and, in England,
certain types of javelin cease to be found. Simultaneously, a change in
defensive weaponry occurs. Fifth- and sixth-century shields were quite
small, their bosses frequently ending in a disc, probably used for catching
an opponent’s blade in a ‘fencing’ style of warfare. In the seventh century
these ‘bucklers’ are replaced by larger shields with longer, heavier bosses,
perhaps more suited simply to shoving or punching. The one-edged dagger
(scramasax) becomes longer, broader, and weightier, resembling a machete.
This perhaps parallels developments in spearheads, which likewise become
larger and heavier. It is risky to deduce a tactical shift from a change in
weaponry but the transformation of armament between c.575 and c.625 seems
to point in one general direction: from possibly faster, more open, fighting
towards combat centred on close-packed hand-to-hand fighting. Larger,
heavier shields and spears seem adapted to this type of warfare as does the
broad, chopping, single-edged scramasax. Indeed, the scramasax combines the
best features of the sword and battle axe, the latter of which disappears from
guy halsall
54
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/21997673/WORKINGFOLDER/CURRY-RG/9780521877152C02.3D 55 [50–82] 19.4.2020 9:33PM
the record until the Viking era. Surviving evidence unfortunately provides no
real clues as to whether defensive armour became more common, as one
might expect. Helmets and armour are proportionately more frequent in the
seventh century than the sixth but the interment of armour was geographi-
cally very restricted, in a way that cannot reflect its actual frequency, and thus
probably more affected by ritual demands than the burial of other items.
Furthermore, outside southern Germany most examples come from entirely
untypical burials (such as the ship burials at Sutton Hoo in East Anglia and at
Vendel and Valsgärde in Sweden).8
Relating developments in armament and the putative tactical change
deduced from them to the transformation in the raising of armies is difficult.
Someweaponry which dropped out of use – especially the francisca – required
specialist training to use effectively, whereas one might wonder whether
close-fighting ‘shield-wall’ tactics were more suitable to larger, comparatively
less well-trained forces. However, as noted, seventh-century armies were not
necessarily more select than sixth-century. Further, and perhaps crucially,
close-fighting techniques probably required more expensive protection, nota-
bly helmets and body armour, which could have restricted participation in it
to those with the economic wherewithal to so furnish themselves and their
followers. This would tally with a growth in aristocratic power. The coherent
employment of close-fighting techniques possibly required the elements of
a ‘shield-wall’ to have more frequent training as a body. This might be more
feasible within an aristocratic retinue than in an irregularly assembled con-
glomeration of landowners. Without more evidence, however, this can only
remain a suggestion.
In much of North-Western Europe, the period after c.600 was one of
economic expansion, possibly enabling slightly larger armies to be mobilised,
at least for large-scale conflict. Economic growth and local aristocrats’
increased private resources might have made it more feasible for aristocrats
to equip larger followings with metal armour and probably the most expen-
sive item of a warrior’s equipment, his horse. However likely this might
seem, and although there are some indications of this in the data, a rise in the
proportion of mounted troops is as impossible to confirm from our evidence
as a growth in the frequency of armour and helmets. As with the other
8 Vendel and Valsgärde: Statens Historiska Museum, Studies 2: Vendel Period, ed. Jan Lamm
and H. A. Nordstrom (Stockholm, Museum of National Antiquities, 1983). Sutton Hoo:
Martin Carver, Sutton Hoo: Burial Ground of Kings? (London, British Museum Press,
1998).
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suggestions linking social and military developments after c.600, it might
nevertheless be retained as a working hypothesis.
The evolution of systems of military service and the rise
of the Carolingians (c.650–c.800)
Just as sixth-century military forces can be seen as the last, shadowy, incarna-
tions of a Roman type of army, seventh-century armed forces might be seen
as the first manifestations of a type of army familiar for most of the remainder
of the ‘medieval millennium’. The methods of raising armies during the
remainder of the period covered by this chapter, and beyond, might be
viewed as developments of the seventh-century ‘template’. The late seventh
and early eighth centuries saw further important developments making
armies even more recognisable to students of the central Middle Ages.
In traditional accounts, the early eighth century saw the introduction of
‘feudalism’: military service performed to a lord in return for land, confirmed
by the swearing of oaths of allegiance or ‘fealty’. Service was performed as
armoured cavalry, the increased cost of which required the warrior to be
given the estates necessary to support himself and bear the cost of his
weaponry. This allegedly involved Frankish rulers, in particular, confiscating
Church lands to support their horse-borne warriors, but sweetening the pill
by having the soldier only ‘hold’ the land, renting it from the relevant church.
Thus, we have the tenure of estates, whose ownership remained ultimately
in the hands of a greater lord, secular or ecclesiastical, in return for rent or the
performance of usually military service, the arrangement being solidified by
oath-swearing. Thus were established the principal elements of the ‘feudal
system’.9
Recent scholarship has called into doubt almost all of this reading.10
Nevertheless, even if its precise details are incorrect, in its general outlines
there may yet be something to be said for the old interpretation. Something
important happened around 700, something indeed related to landholding,
the relationships between warriors and their lords, and those between power-
ful aristocrats and the king. The major early seventh-century changes
described above centred on the creation of a powerful aristocratic stratum
9 The best traditional view of ‘the feudal system’ is François-Louis Ganshof, Feudalism,
3rd edn (London, Harper, 1964). Marc Bloch, Feudal Society, 2 vols. (London, Routledge,
1962), more subtle than most of his contemporaries’ and successors’ discussions of
‘feudalism’, is not really concerned with ‘system’ at all.
10 Susan Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1994); Paul Fouracre, The Age of Charles Martel (Manchester,
Manchester University Press, 2000).
guy halsall
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with other freemen dependent upon them. However, from the surviving
evidence, outright gifts of land or other resources seemingly remained the
aristocratic means of rewarding followers. Although ties of dependence or
allegiance doubtless persisted, such gifts had the effect of reducing an aristo-
crat’s resources. Partible inheritance, requiring all sons (at least) to be
bequeathed more-or-less equal shares of the patrimony, the requirements
of land-grants for dower and dowry, and other gifts further meant the
repeated break-up of aristocratic estates.
This was probably one important reason why politics remained focused on
the royal courts in spite of, in Francia, the usual minority of the Merovingian
kings and, in Visigothic Spain, serious dynastic instability. Aristocrats had to
return to court to acquire new lands to replace those bestowed upon
followers and to have titles, the other key support of local and regional pre-
eminence, confirmed and legitimised. Aristocratic families tried many means
of combating this situation. Testamentary disposition (by will) was one way
by which a greater share of the estate could be left in the hands of one son.
Other documents begin to survive or be alluded to, through which custom-
ary law could be circumvented. Across Europe, aristocratic rural ‘family
monasteries’ begin to be attested more frequently. By bestowing lands
upon a monastic foundation, over which control was retained, resources
could also be kept intact. Monastic lands were not subject to partible
inheritance but could be loaned, by the abbot (usually a family member or
protégé), to one member of the dynasty.
However, in factional politics, such as dominated Spain and, from the
middle of the century, Francia, the situation described above spelled serious
problems for aristocrats excluded from the royal court. Such individuals
found themselves unable to receive royal grants to replace lands given to
followers and barred from the essential royal legitimation of titles. Most
means of circumventing partible inheritance and other aspects of customary
law were of only limited utility. In factional civil war, moreover, the winners
showed themselves only too ready to depose the abbots of family monas-
teries and replace them with their own adherents, thus acquiring the institu-
tion’s lands. It is therefore probably not surprising that aristocratic families
evolved new means of dealing with the dangers of this situation. These
evolved from the previous state of affairs.
Precaria and beneficium are both encountered in Roman law to describe
situations where a gift was not regarded as necessarily permanent, and could
be revoked later. In early medieval terms, there appears to have been little
real difference between lands held as precaria or beneficium, the distinction
The Western European kingdoms, 600–1000
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simply relating, on the one hand, to the way in which the gift had been
obtained (through a plea or precaria) and, on the other, to the nature of the
grant (as a benefit, or beneficium). In the post-imperial world, precaria were
means of giving ecclesiastical servants land as a stipend, lending it to them, as
precaria. As Church lands grew and became too large to manage directly,
similar precaria were granted to laymen, in return for rent.11
From c.700 – crucially – these types of grant were seemingly extended to
secular estates. References begin to lands held by lesser freemen from more
powerful secular aristocrats, as precaria or beneficium.12 This importantly meant
that noble families could reward followers while not actually diminishing their
patrimony, the land ultimately remaining (theoretically) under the grantor’s
control. Such aristocrats’ power could thus be independent of the royal court.
No longer was access to court patronage necessary tomaintain the extent of their
landholdings. Even the loss of control over bishoprics and monasteries might be
survived without implying a diminution in the ability to reward or maintain
followers. This was decisive in the relationships between central, royal govern-
ment and local or regional power. TheMerovingian royal house becameobsolete
from this point. Regions like Aquitaine and Provence drifted away into effective
semi-detachment. Thus, the traditional view of the creation of ‘feudalism’ had
correctly identified a vital period of change but its understanding and explanation
of those transformations were flawed. The aristocratic retinue’s importance was
further underlined and the links that bound such followings were reinforced.
As Charles Martel secured control over Francia, the use of Church lands to
reward followers became more widespread. By the middle of the eighth
century something like a regulated system was introduced, setting out rents
and some checks and balances to avoid abuse. This earned Charles Martel
ecclesiastical opprobrium but provided solid support for his well-equipped
and successful armies.
From the early eighth century, the term vassus (‘vassal’) was frequently
used to describe warriors in the service of a lord.13 It appears to have been old,
11 Precaria: Ian Wood, ‘Tetsind, Witlaic and the History of Merovingian Precaria’, in
Wendy Davies and Paul Fouracre (eds.), Property and Power in the Early Middle Ages
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 31–52; Fouracre, Age of Charles
Martel, pp. 137–45.
12 For example, two charters of the Abbey of Wissembourg, Alsace, issued in 735/6 and
739: Traditiones Wizenburgenses: Die Urkunden des Klosters Weissenburg, 661–864, ed.
Karl Glöckner and Anton Doll (Darmstadt, Arbieten der Hessischen Historischen
Kommission, 1979), nos. 9–10.
13 Elisabeth Magnou-Nortier, Foi et fidelité: récherches sur l’evolution des liens personnels chez
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possibly of Celtic origin, but its pre-eminence may have stemmed from
a need for new terminology in a novel political situation. Former words for
these sorts of links, such as antrustio, had too many connections with the
Merovingian dynasty so a replacement was needed. It must, however, be
stressed that as yet these relationships by no means represented any sort of
‘system’. Precarial estate-ownership, existed, as did oaths of vassalage but the
extent to which the one was directly linked to the other is unclear. There is
even less evidence of the specification of the type or amount of service
expected.
The Franks’ successful eighth-century wars of aggression were based on
this type of army. These campaigns’ frequency produced a class of very
experienced warriors; with experience grew military competence and the
increased chance of battlefield success and survival. This in turn gave rise to
ever greater confidence and high morale. In these circumstances it is unsur-
prising that the various Frankish aristocratic factions gradually lost out to the
victorious Carolingians as warriors joined Charles Martel, or that, under
Martel, his sons, and grandsons, the Franks’ opponents so rarely put up
effective battlefield opposition.
Spain and England
The pattern of developments sketched above is based squarely upon evi-
dence from Gaul, or Francia as it came to be called. Nevertheless, the general
outlines pertain to most of Western Europe, even if the precise explanations
must differ. Visigothic Spain witnessed a similar overall shift from a royal
army raised from administrative units and commanded by the king’s officials
towards one centred around aristocratic personal followings. Kings legislated
to reserve the control of these retinues to themselves. Some dynamics of this
change might have been analogous to those in Francia. A distinctive
Visigothic feature, however, was the military service of servi (slaves). The
slaves that landlord-warriors were ordered to bring to the armywere possibly
intended to serve as baggage attendants and guards rather than fulfil a formal
battlefield function. However, Egica called up all former slaves freed by the
king on pain of their return to servility. This was possibly an attempt to create
a force directly dependent upon the kings, as might Egica’s predecessor
Ervig’s summoning of servi fiscals (fiscal slaves).14 Troops raised from royal
14 Visigothic Laws, 9.2.8–9:Monumenta Germaniae Historica Legum Sectio I, vol. 1:
Leges Visigothorum, ed. Karl Zeumer (Hanover, 1902). S. P. Scott’s early twen-
tieth-century translation is online at http://libro.uca.edu/vcode/visigoths.htm;
the numbering of clauses sometimes differs from that in the MGH edition.
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estates might form the nucleus of an independent royal coercive force.
Indeed there seems to be something of an early medieval Iberian tradition
of slave-soldiers, beginning with the sixth-century king Theudis’s levying of
a force of 2,000 slaves from his Hispano-Roman wife’s estates through to the
use of slave-soldiers by the tenth-century caliphs of Cordoba.15 However, the
‘problem’ of Visigothic ‘slave soldiers’may be more apparent than real; more
recent studies have suggested that Spanish servi were tenants of aristocratic
estates rather than slaves.16
Even Anglo-Saxon England, so often considered in isolation from the
European mainland, reveals the same general outlines. Fifth- and sixth-
century archaeological burial data suggest that military service, as elsewhere,
might have been linked to ethnicity. When written records begin to survive,
although their scarcity permits alternative readings, a development can
nevertheless be proposed that would be recognisable from the Frankish
account. Earlier in the seventh century it seems that lands were granted to
warriors who had successfully served an apprenticeship in a retinue. They
were granted in perpetuity but subject to partible inheritance and other
customary demands, leading to the fragmentation of estates each generation.
During that century, therefore, we can detect the same strategies employed
to circumvent this situation as we encountered in Francia: the creation of
aristocratic religious foundations and so on. Around 700, as in Visigothic
Spain, kings legislated to ensure that retinues based around lines of depen-
dence were still ultimately under royal command.17 Such laws are often
assumed to reflect long-standing traditions but it is surely more plausible
that they were active attempts to create norms in periods of change. Kings
began to specify, when they granted land to their nobles, that they were still
expected to perform military service and this might reflect lesser aristocratic
concerns to clarify what ultimately remained their property in gifts to their
followers. In the raising of armies, the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms do not seem
dramatically different from those of the Franks.
15 Procopius, Wars 5.12.50–4:Procopius: History of the Wars and Buildings, vol. 3, History of
the Wars, ed. and trans. Henry Dewing (London, Heinemann, 1919); Cordoban slave
soldiers: Richard Fletcher,Moorish Spain (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993),
p. 61; Hugh Kennedy, Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus
(London, Longman, 1996), pp. 85–7.
16 Christopher Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean,
400–800 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005; rev. edn, 2006), p. 231.
17 Ine’s Laws 5, 51:English Historical Documents, vol. 1: c.500–1042, ed. and trans.
Dorothy Whitelock, 2nd edn (London, Eyre Methuen, 1979), document 32.
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The Lombard exception
The principal exception to the general pattern just established, of the gradual
evolution of armies from royally controlled coercive forces into conglomer-
ates of aristocratic retinues, whose service was not entirely reliably assured
by the monarchs, comes not from England but from Italy. Evidence about
military service from seventh-century Lombard Italy is not very forthcoming.
Historians have often assumed that the picture of the Lombard kingdom in
the eighth century is applicable in the seventh but this is a shaky assumption.
If anything, the archaeological and other data from the seventh century
might suggest a weaker central authority and greater power held by the
regional dukes. What little information one can glean about the seventh-
century army suggests one not very different from its contemporaries in
Francia, Spain, and Britain, based around aristocratic retinues.
This, however, appears to change in the eighth century when, especially in
the long reign of Liutprand (712–44), royal power grew significantly, along-
side military expansion and the absorption of hitherto independent terri-
tories. The eighth-century Lombard army shows some similarities with those
of the sixth century in other kingdoms. Through various mechanisms, the
king established a link with the lesser free landholder, making sociopolitical
advancement dependent upon royal patronage.18 In this he may have been
helped by the fact that Lombard nobles were apparently not as wealthy and
powerful as their Frankish counterparts.19 Free status became commensurate
with the title of exercitalis or arimannus (army-man), a social group that, by
the eighth century appears to have included Romans and Lombards, and the
king instituted annual Marchfields at which laws were promulgated and
other political business enacted.20 A general oath of loyalty was sworn by
the arimanni to the king and the slightly later legal requirements that lesser
landowners serve in the army might be an attempt to maintain direct links
between the king and this social stratum, ensuring that the army did not
become an agglomeration of aristocratic retinues. As in sixth-century Francia,
the army seemingly served as an independent royal coercive force. The
eighth-century Lombard royal army was successful within Italy, absorbing
18 Christopher Wickham, ‘Aristocratic Power in Eighth-Century Lombard Italy’, in
Alexander Callander Murray (ed.), After Rome’s Fall: Narrators and Sources of Early
Medieval History: Essays Presented to Walter Goffart (Toronto, University of Toronto
Press, 1998), pp. 153–70.
19 Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages, pp. 203–19.
20 All fourteen dated legal pronouncements of Liutprand are dated 1 March, as are the
laws of Ratchis and both codes of Ratchis’ brother Aistulf. The Lombard Laws, trans.
Katherine Drew (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1973).
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most of the remaining East Roman (Byzantine) and independent Lombard
enclaves. This success of course posed a threat to the pope who, when the
inability of the Eastern emperor to provide effective military support became
clear, turned to the Franks for help. The latter eventually conquered the
Lombard realm in 774.21
The period after Liutprand’s death saw internal dissension within the
Lombard kingdom and, unsurprisingly, almost all of the legislation referring
to military service comes from this period of usurpation. Often assumed to
represent age-old, traditional military organisation, it is better viewed in
context, as attempts by insecure rulers to ensure the service of their aristo-
crats and maintain links with more humble arimanni. The Lombards were
unable to put up very serious resistance to the Frankish invasions under
Pippin I or his son Charlemagne, which has sometimes been seen as sympto-
matic of various structural weaknesses. A crisis in morale has been proposed
on the basis of the fact that some Lombards made their wills before setting
out to join the army, but this seems a little hasty.22 One of the will-makers
was a bishop (Walprand of Lucca) and wills or similar arrangements for
inheritance are known to have beenmade in armies across the early medieval
West, including Charlemagne’s at the height of his success. Wickham sug-
gests more interestingly that Lombard military weakness derived from the
relative poverty of the aristocracy.23 Yet, the law codes (like the seventh-
century cemetery evidence) suggest that the wealthier rungs of the arimanni
were as well equipped as their Frankish opponents. It is possible that they
were outnumbered by their Frankish opposite numbers, and that they were
less able to raise large, well-equipped retinues, but the principle reason for
their military failures would seem to be a difference in military experience.
The Frankish armies were involved in annual, successful campaigning since
the second decade of the century ensuring a continuous stream of battle-
hardened warriors through the ranks, training their juniors. By contrast, the
last decades of the Lombard realm, especially in Desiderius’s reign, were
generally peaceful. The comparatively inexperienced Lombard army even-
tually collapsed before the attack of a well-equipped, battle-hardened force
21 Royal Frankish Annals, s.a. 773–4; Revised Annals, s.a. 773–4.Charlemagne: Translated
Sources, trans. Preston King (Lancaster, P. D. King, 1986).
22 Christopher Wickham, Early Medieval Italy: Local Society and Central Power, 400–1000
(London, Macmillan, 1981), p. 46; Codice Diplomatico Longobardo, ed. L. Schiaparelli, 2
vols., Fonti per la Storia d’Italia 62–63 (Rome, Istituto Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1929,
1933), nos. 114 (Lucca, July 754) and 117 (August 755).
23 Wickham, Framing the Early Middle Ages, p. 218.
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commanded by one of the most strategically adept commanders of the
Middle Ages.
Part 2: Intermission: early medieval warfare,
politics, and identity in theory and practice
War and kingship
Kingship remained intimately bound up with military success.24 This was
nothing new. Roman emperors, particularly in the later imperial period, had
had to be successful soldiers. What seems to have changed around 600, as
part of the general readjustment discussed above, was how martial rulership
was discussed. Even if the ideals remained, there seems to have been a shift of
emphasis away from classical towards Old Testament exemplars.25 The
reasons for the shift might stem from a combination of increasing self-
confidence on the part of the kings of Western Europe and a growing unease
in proclaiming Roman-ness after Emperor Justinian’s attempts to reconquer
the Roman Empire’s western territories. This military effort, which
destroyed two kingdoms and helped plunge a third into crisis, was associated
with an ideological offensive, propagating the idea that the western king-
doms were ruled not by legitimate kings who (as they had tended to claim in
the fifth century) represented the old empire under newmanagement, but by
barbarians who had conquered these territories. In this climate, even if the
fundamental ideals of good rulership (piety, justice, generosity, and military
prowess) remained the same, new touchstones were needed. Thus, Solomon
and David began to edge out Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, and even Constantine
as model kings.
Nor was it only a question of ideas. The penalties for military failure were
high. Indeed, a mark of the Merovingian kings’ success is that they retained
the throne in spite of rarely taking the field after the earlier seventh century.
The powerful kings of the dynasty had not often participated in military
campaigns in the third quarter of the sixth century but from the 590s, possibly
as a response to the changes discussed earlier, the Merovingians returned to
leading their armies in person up until the 630s. Nevertheless, Sigibert III’s
24 Michael McCormick, Eternal Victory: Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity, Byzantium
and the Early Medieval West, paperback edn (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1990). John Wallace-Hadrill, Early Germanic Kingship in England and on the Continent
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1971); Janet Nelson, Politics and Ritual in Early
Medieval Europe (London, Hambledon Press, 1986).
25 Yitzhak Hen, ‘The Uses of the Bible and the Perception of Kingship in Merovingian
Gaul’, Early Medieval Europe 7 (1998), 277–89, and references.
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defeat by Radulf, dux of the Thuringians resulted in the Franks losing their
earlier hegemony over the peoples east of the Rhine. A defeat at the hands of
the West Saxons at Burford (752) may have caused crisis in Mercia. Its king,
Æthelbald, briefly lost his hegemony over southern England and a few years
later was done to death by his own bodyguard. Towards the end of our
period, the downfall of Emperor Charles III ‘the Fat’ resulted in no small part
from his enemies’ ability to exploit perceived military failures against the
Vikings. Examples can be multiplied from across the early medieval West of
kings whose regimes were called into crisis by their failure to perform the
role of military leader with adequate success. Not surprisingly, therefore,
leading a campaign was one of the first tasks of any new king.
Concomitant with military kingship was the army’s dominance of politics.
Early Frankish Gaul and eighth-century Lombard Italy held annual military
gatherings on 1 March (the ‘Marchfield’). In eighth-century Francia this
muster was pushed back to 1 May to ensure better availability of fodder for
the warriors’ horses. This was not the only time that armies were mustered;
campaigns took place through much of the year. Nevertheless, these were
politically important gatherings. In the last decade of the sixth century,
Childebert II of Austrasia (575–96) held three such Marchfields at which he
promulgated edicts.26 The many edicts of the Lombard king Liutprand and
his successors are all dated to 1March.27 Thus, between the seventh and tenth
centuries the army, as a gathering of the powerful, remained the principal
political assembly, at which a ruler established and underlined the (however
fictive) consensus within his kingdom. Laws are often said to have been
issued with the approval of the army. Royal charters, too, are found being
issued while the king was on campaign.28 In the sixth century, gatherings of
the army were important fora at which the king subjected the army to his
ideology, rewarded warriors who had done well, and punished those who
had not. Even in the Carolingian empire, when the nature of the army and its
precise relationship to the king had changed considerably, these assemblies
remained enormously important in establishing dynastic legitimacy.
26 Childebert II’s Decrees: The Laws of the Salian Franks, trans. Katherine Drew
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), pp. 156–9.
27 See above, n. 22.
28 For example, the charter issued by King Ecgberht of Wessex on 19 August 825, when
the king ‘moved against the Britons’ (whom he defeated at the battle of Galford):
Cartularium Saxonicum, ed. Walter de Gray Birch, 3 vols. (London, Whiting &
Co.,1885–93), no. 389. See Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a. 825: English Historical Documents,
vol. 1, doc. no. 1.
guy halsall
64
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/21997673/WORKINGFOLDER/CURRY-RG/9780521877152C02.3D 65 [50–82] 19.4.2020 9:33PM
War and masculinity
Closely related to the army’s political dominance is another constant of early
medieval Western European history: the linkage between warfare and mas-
culinity. Throughout the Roman period, a civic model of masculinity had
managed to hold sway even when loyal service to the state in its armies was
a component of that ideal. At the end of the imperial era, however, a rival
martial model began to appear, its existence being one means by which the
inhabitants of Roman Europe were able to negotiate the end of the empire.29
By c.600, this model had become completely dominant. The last traces of
a secular civic model of masculinity disappeared during the sixth century.
What had earlier been parallel career patterns and lifestyles – even if the civic
model was coming to be valued less – had evolved into a situation where the
martial model was the only one available within free, secular life; the other
had sunk to equivalence with unfree status. The Church offered the only
alternative form of masculinity and repeated ecclesiastical concern with
banning clergy from carrying arms illustrates how, even among churchmen,
this removal from the usual construction of manliness could create serious
anxieties. The association of masculinity with warfare can be seen in a wide
array of evidence. Archaeologically, throughout much of seventh-century
Europe, weapons remained the masculine grave-goods par excellence. This
seems to have continued in parts of Scandinavia and elsewhere through the
Viking Age. That these weapons do not simply symbolise a right to partici-
pate in violence can be argued from the changing, but nevertheless compara-
tively restricted, distribution of these items, whereas the written sources
suggest that legitimate participation in low-level violence was not limited to
particular ethnic identities or classes, or either sex, or even necessarily
restricted to the free. Involvement in warfare was, however, a much more
regulated matter. Partly this was because raising the army was a formal, even
ritualised business. The army’s political importance served to limit participa-
tion further. Thus weaponry, I suggest, represents the right to participate in
that more limited form of violence. Such rights could be jealously guarded; in
859 the Frankish aristocracy took up arms and cut down peasants and other
lowly folk who had presumed to form armed associations to defend their
regions fromViking depredations (something the ‘elite’was signally failing to
do).30 Charles II ‘the Bald’ even legislated to ensure that poorer freemen,
29 Guy Halsall, ‘Gender and the End of Empire’, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern
Studies 34.1 (2004), 17–39.
30 Annals of St-Bertin, s.a. 859: The Annals of St-Bertin: Ninth-Century Histories, trans. Janet
Nelson, 2 vols. (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1991), vol. 1.
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whom he encouraged to join the army, could do so without fear of attack by
their betters.31
The practice of war
It is often thought that the early medieval era was a ‘heroic age’.32 It is difficult
to see this in the period’s more prosaic records, although seventh- to tenth-
century sources are hardly rich in strategic and tactical detail. What is
noticeable is how frequently depictions of heroic warfare relate to eras before
the composition of the, usually poetic, sources. For example, the early Welsh
poetry purporting to describe the northern British kings’wars against ‘Saxon’
invaders33 includes characters and events supposedly belonging to the period
around 600 CE, but these poems were composed long afterwards. The earliest
recently proposed dating of this corpus of material sees them as mid-seventh-
century products.34 This has not commanded consent but even were the date
accepted it is significant that we would nevertheless have to see these poems
as being divided from the events described by the ‘military revolution’
around 600. It was suggested that this ‘revolution’ made warfare more of
a close-packed, shield-wall ‘slogging match’, with little scope for heroic
individuals. Perhaps the poets were creating a ‘golden age’, one which had
conceivably never existed. The same could be true a fortiori for the warfare
described in the Irish sagas’ accounts of the conflicts between the long-gone
realms of Leinster and Ulster, and Carolingian epics about the warriors of the
migration period, such asWaltharius.35Nor is it impossible, given the location
of these works’ composition and transmission and the sometimes absurd
feats described, that they represent monkish satire on secular martial boast-
ing. To suggest that post-imperial Europeans held martial valour or heroism
in little regard is clearly erroneous, but epic or poetic depictions of heroic
warfare do not seem to have much of a basis in reality.
31 Edict of Pîtres (25 June, 864), ch. 26: Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Legum Sectio 2:
Capitularia Regum Francorum 1–2, ed. Alfredus Boretius and Victor Krause, 2 vols.
(Hanover, Berolini, 1883, 1895–7), no. 273.
32 Henry Chadwick, The Heroic Age (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1912).
33 The Gododdin: Text and Context from Dark-Age North Britain, ed. and trans. John Koch
(Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1997). The Taliesin Poems: New Translations, ed. and
trans. Meirion Pennar (Llanerch, 1988).
34 The Gododdin.
35 Walthari: A Verse Translation of the Medieval Latin Waltharius, trans. Brian Murdoch
(Glasgow, Scottish Papers in Germanic Studies, 1989); The Tain, trans. Thomas Kinsella
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969).
guy halsall
66
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/21997673/WORKINGFOLDER/CURRY-RG/9780521877152C02.3D 67 [50–82] 19.4.2020 9:33PM
Leaving aside this ‘heroic’ notion, what can be said about the practice of
early medieval warfare?Wemust note that in scale it varied not only through
time and place but also according to its type; there seems to have been
a gradation of scales of warfare. Most appears to have been comparatively
small-scale, reasonably described as endemic and even, given its apparent
government by norms, as ritual. Given the dominance in early medieval
Western society and politics of identities closely bound up with participation
in military activities, this should not be surprising. A reasonably frequent
summoning of the army was necessary to underpin these identities. Yet such
warfare could not be carried out with such regularity on a large scale without
risking the fatal undermining of the social, political, and economic system.
Thus, particular norms and codes, enshrined by repeated observation rather
than through any actual codification, apparently restricted the scale of con-
flict. The frequency of small-scale warfare can be seen in areas such as eighth-
century Francia, where we have unusually detailed narrative sources (which
nevertheless do not record all military campaigns!) and also in the concern of
some legislation, seemingly drawn up as part of a peace-making process, to
limit cross-border raiding.36
However, frequent small-scale endemic fighting could cause tensions to
build up. If military supremacy was established, raids could turn into simple
tribute takings and the domination of weaker realms. This situation might be
challenged by an outbreak of more serious war in which the usual norms
were ignored. This dual pattern – a background of small-scale conflict
punctuated by periodic outbursts of major warfare – can be observed in
several areas. In Anglo-Saxon England, many sources make clear that war
was endemic and vital to social structure. Yet the great, if limited, narrative
sources for the ‘middle Saxon’ period (c.600–c.800) only record wars between
the island’s major kingdoms about once per generation. Given that these
narratives tend to be written later, it seems clear that only the major out-
bursts of warfare have been remembered. The usual small-scale raiding and
counter-raiding, though its existence is acknowledged by these narratives, has
simply not been recorded. Although the sources are much fuller, making the
different types of conflict more difficult to distinguish, Frankish warfare
seemingly followed similar patterns. The eighth-century campaigns in
36 The frequency of later eighth-century Frankish Warfare: The Royal Frankish Annals and
The Revised Annals. A sample from an earlier period: Halsall, Warfare and Society in the
Barbarian West, Appendix, pp. 231–3. Peace treaties between the Frankish rulers of Italy
and the Doges of Venice: Capitularia Regum Francorum 1–2, nos. 233–4 (840), 235 (856), 237
(883), 238 (888) and 239 (891).
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Aquitaine, for instance, were composed largely of raids or the insertion of
garrisons into strategic points, with only a few major, set-piece encounters.
An analogous pattern can be observed in Charlemagne’s Saxon campaigns.
Around the start of the era covered by this chapter, the stylised, limited
warfare conducted between rival members of theMerovingian dynasty led to
a build-up of tensions that resulted in two very serious outbreaks of ‘no holds
barred’ warfare, in 574–5 and 612–13. Other such crises were averted in 587–8
and 625–6 by the intervention of bishops and the creation of peace treaties
and new law codes.
This conclusion permits us to circumnavigate some controversies about
early medieval warfare. One such debate has concerned the size and compo-
sition of armies and has frequently been characterised by the participants’
desire to see their interpretation apply ‘across the board’. Some sources
suggest that armies could be quite small, numbered in hundreds (the extreme
‘thirty-six-man army’ point of view cannot be maintained); yet others seem
reliably to discuss armies numbering several thousand men. Equally, while
some evidence apparently attests to participation in the army being tightly
restricted to the powerful, other data seem to show involvement by poorer
freemen. Another debate concerns whether warfare was conducted primarily
on foot or on horseback. In Anglo-Saxon military history these debates have
often been marred by the selection of sources from diverse points in time,
regardless of context. However, if we accept that war occurred on different
scales, we can resolve many of these evident contradictions. Low-level
warfare could have been conducted with small armies of noblemen, fighting
on horseback and perhaps using particular tactics. By contrast, major conflicts
would see the recruitment of larger forces, including warriors from further
down the social scale. In addition to the possibility that such inclusive forces
would not be composed entirely of horsemen and that the ‘rank and file’
might (as is attested) need stiffening by front ranks of dismounted aristocrats,
the fact that such warfare aimed to produce decisive results might further
plead for the conduct of such ‘set pieces’ on foot.
Warfare’s scale was also determined by time and place. In the immedi-
ately post-imperial period, with economic contraction and decline, it is
unlikely that armies ever numbered more than 4,000–5,000 men even in
major outbursts. However, as noted, the opening of our period saw an
important economic change leading to the revival of North-Western
Europe (northern Gaul, Anglo-Saxon England, and other territories border-
ing the North Sea), even as more southerly, Mediterranean (and, in Britain,
western) areas stagnated. This may have been important in enabling the
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general military pre-eminence of those areas throughout the centuries that
concern us. Further, steady economic growth took place during the period,
surely permitting concomitant increases in warfare’s scale. In particular the
ninth and, especially, the tenth centuries witnessed significant economic
expansion and a growth in the size of settlements. This might well have
changed the nature of campaigning; it also meant that whereas between
c.600 and c.800 large armies were probably usually numbered in the region
of 5,000 men, perhaps more on occasion, after 800 armies of 10,000 and, by
the end of our period, more were feasible (at least occasionally and for
short periods). These statements, however, relate principally to the major
Western realms. In areas such as Ireland, the north of Great Britain,
Scandinavia, and the Breton and Basque edges of the Frankish world,
armies could rarely if ever be of this magnitude. Even when the socio-
political sophistication of such areas is rightly acknowledged, the economic
(or even ecological) bases for warfare would be unlikely to enable warfare
involving more than a few thousand men, even when conducted on
a major scale at the end of our period.
Unsurprisingly, campaign objectives varied with the nature of warfare.
Endemic war, perhaps surprisingly, seems generally to have been aimed at
maintaining the status quo. Participation in the activities of the army was the
underpinning of much of the period’s social and political structures, rein-
forced by small-scale warfare. Loot from raids was redistributed to followers,
reaffirming ties of dependence; warriors had the opportunity to impress their
superiors and receive other forms of patronage, promotion, or titles. When,
as was often the case, the other side retaliated by launching a counter-raid,
the same factors would apply. Material recently taken as booty would be
taken back, in its turn reinforcing social and political ties and identities within
that kingdom. The complete destruction of the enemy would, in this type of
war, be counter-productive.
Early medieval Western European strategy seems to have been quite
distinctive, differing in important ways from that in other parts of the
Middle Ages. Battle appears to have been an object of campaigns to a much
greater degree than it was to be after c.1000. Most campaigns appear to have
focused upon looting enemy territory, which, while important in oiling the
cogs of politics within the realm, simultaneously hit the opposing ruler’s
claim to be a good lord, war-leader, and protector of his people. Raids could
be, and were, bought off or ignored from behind the shelter of walls until the
attackers went home or succumbed to disease, but a failure actively to
confront invaders or, at the very least, conduct a successful punitive raid
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produced internal tensions. Even kings who successfully faced down invaders
from within fortified centres were overthrown by disgruntled nobles.37
Thus, set-piece encounters (even if small) were comparatively frequent.
Battles, furthermore, were risky so that even minor engagements could have
serious political results, when leading political figures were slain; many early
medieval kings, princes, and high nobles died in battle. Why forces should
have been committed to battle so readily, when the outcome, as contempor-
aries well knew, was so uncertain might be understood by reference to the
importance of warfare in underpinning of social and political identities in an
era when social hierarchies were potentially quite fluid. This, it can be
suggested, led to a need for frequent battle. The comparative regularity of
battlefield engagement might also be explained by consideration of the
economy and settlement pattern. As mentioned, even if the centuries
between 600 and 1000 saw steady economic growth, for most of the period
towns were small, with inhabitants, even late in the period, numbering only
a few thousand. Estimates of the populations of major seventh- to ninth-
century trading centres have placed them only in the region of 1,000 souls.
These sites were not sources of enormous wealth until quite late within our
period. Simultaneously, wealthy high-status fortified settlements, such as
would later be represented by castles, were absent. The principal exceptions
to this general rule weremonasteries – one reason for their frequent targeting
by Viking attacks and for the outrage this produced. Furthermore, fortifica-
tion and siege warfare were fairly rudimentary. Thus, high-ranking secular
noblemen tended to carry their wealth with them, including when on
campaign. For this reason, in warfare significant economic benefits were
most likely to accrue from defeating the enemy in the field and plundering
their baggage, rather than through besieging settlements. This began to
change by the tenth century, however, and by 1000 we have entered the
world of knights and castles, with different strategic practices.
Nevertheless, we must not overemphasise booty’s importance in early
medieval warfare. It has frequently been argued that the acquisition of loot
was the principal motor for campaigning, with the inability to continue to
take rich pickings producing stress within realms.38However, although booty
37 For example, the Slavic dux Liudewit: Royal Frankish Annals, s.a. 822.
38 Timothy Reuter, ‘Plunder and Tribute in the Carolingian Empire’, Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society, Series 5, 35 (1985), 75–94; Timothy Reuter, ‘The End of
Carolingian Military Expansion’, in Charlemagne’s Heir: Annales Regni Francorum: New
Perspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious, ed. Peter Godman and Roger Collins (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 391–405.
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was important, it was not the overriding object of warfare. Given that this
was, comparatively, not a period of great economic prosperity this should not
surprise us. Warfare yielded other, possibly more important benefits, many
of quite intangible form. War offered opportunities for warriors to come to
their superiors’ attention and receive their patronage as a result. Lands, titles,
involvement at the heart of politics, and the management of a patronage
network of one’s ownmight ensue. Even if one did not move far up the social
ladder, the backing of an important noble or royal figure could be enor-
mously important within local politics. Sometimes, booty taken on campaign
was passed on to more powerful figures, precisely to obtain these forms of
backing and promotion. In sum, warfare was vital to the machinery of early
medieval politics in many ways; the acquisition of loot was only one, and
probably not the most important.
The evidence for early medieval tactics is notoriously thin. In the first part
of this period, as discussed, we are largely reduced to using the forms of
weaponry to suggest how battles were conducted, with all the inherent
methodological risks. One problem is a simple shortage of actual descriptions
of battles; another is the enormously stylised nature of those that do survive.
From most accounts we cannot definitively conclude even whether the
participants fought on foot or on horseback. The evidential filter is so
capricious that we cannot know what weight to place on those snippets of
information that do make it down to us. Some tentative suggestions can be
made nevertheless. Perhaps the most important is that tactics do not appear
to have differed much whether the opposing armies were mounted or
dismounted. The two sides seem to have formed large, close-packed blocks,
which advanced slowly, paying careful attention to order and cohesion.
Contact was preceded by volleys of missiles and rear ranks continued to
shoot or lob missiles over the heads of the forward ranks into the enemy
rear.39 Usually, one side would eventually break and be pursued and cut
down; these were the stages of battle that produced most casualties.
Alternatively, it appears that the two sides would, if neither side broke,
draw apart, and a lull would ensue while the armies tended wounds and
attempted to recover sufficient energy and nerve to rejoin battle. Battles
could, therefore, be long, bloody, and indecisive. On the fringes of Western
Europe there were exceptions. Breton, Basque, and Irish warfare might have
39 Note the similarity between Waltharius’s account of a battle between two mounted
forces and Anglo-Saxon poetic accounts of the conflicts between shield-walls. Note
also, however, that Anglo-Saxon armies are very rarely actually specified as being
entirely dismounted.
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involved a more open, skirmishing kind of fighting more suited to the local
terrain. Frankish accounts of the defeat at Roncesvalles bemoan the fact that
the Basques ‘unfairly’ refused to stand and engage in the usual slogging
match.
Part 3: c.800–c.1000
The end of Carolingian expansion
That little legislation about military service survives from eighth-century
Francia is in manyways unsurprising. The Carolingians’ successful campaigns
brought enormous wealth to their warriors, making participation in warfare
attractive to the land-owning classes. Ensuring that people performed their
military service rarely if ever concerned the early Carolingians. By contrast,
after Charlemagne’s imperial coronation in 800 considerably more legislation
was issued on the subject than during the whole eighth century. This clearly
indicates change and illustrates graphically the problems caused by the end of
Frankish expansion. Indeed, the increase in royal or imperial pronounce-
ments about military service – by whom, in what form, and with what
equipment – is matched by a contemporary rise in the number of legal
enactments about people failing to carry out such obligations.
The dominant explanation for this shift has been provided by two important
articles by the late Timothy Reuter, arguing that the end of the opportunity to
take booty produced stress within the Frankish empire.40 This was possibly
associated with a shift from offensive warfare to defensive campaigns against
invaders like the Vikings. Although Reuter’s explanation is preferable to earlier
analyses, it is not entirely satisfactory. Crucial are the empire’s size and the lack
of royal or imperial foci for campaigning as Charlemagne grew old and two of
his three sons (all of whom were apparently able commanders) predeceased
him. Warfare was important for political advancement and the acquisition of
patronage. With the imperial court, the focus of politics, remaining at the
geographical core of the kingdom there was little incentive to campaign on the
frontiers. Charlemagne’s legislation reveals that offensive campaigns were as
difficult to recruit for as defensive ones, a decisive objection to complete
acceptance of Reuter’s thesis. Ever more distant from the Frankish imperial
heartlands, the frontiers were more costly to reach, reducing the profit margin
even of successful warfare. More importantly, perhaps, if the army were not
accompanied by the emperor or one of his sons, campaigning on the frontier
40 Above, n. 40
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represented removal from the political centre, a sort of exile. The first crisis of
the reign of Charlemagne’s heir, Louis I ‘the Pious’, was indeed produced by
his despatch to the Spanishmarch of two important noblemen from one palace
faction, focused on Louis’s troublesome eldest son, Lothar, while he brought
their rival, Bernard of Septimania, from that frontier to the court. The oppor-
tunities to take part in aggressive warfare had not ceased but did not determine
willing participation in military activity.
The appearance of Vikings, a new wave of Muslim raiders, and, later,
Magyar (or Hungarian) attackers, meant that defensive warfare becamemore
of a concern of ninth-century rulers. These attacks were also qualitatively
different. Defensive wars were less popular amongst the military elite, pre-
senting far less opportunity for rewards in loot, political advancement, or
prestige. For these and other reasons, then, the ninth century saw, across
Christian Europe, a constant concern with military obligation.
The raising of armies apparently differed between defensive wars and
other conflicts, such as the warfare between the various Frankish kingdoms.
In the latter, as in the offensive wars that continued to take place on the
eastern frontier of the empire at least, the basic seventh- and eighth-century
template remained; armies were raised from the retinues of those of social
classes generally held liable for military service. The precise choice of who
served and who remained at home could bemoderated by specific local social
relationships and patronage networks but it should be remembered that
general notions of wealth- or status-based liability for military service per-
sisted. Ninth-century legislation and exemptions from military service make
that abundantly clear.
The Carolingians’ ultimate reliance upon their nobles’ military followings
presented amajor problem. It posed a real threat to effective royal government
in the localities and increased the extent to which royal action was circum-
scribed by the need for negotiation with the magnates. Many of the upper
aristocratic stratum had relatives, and often held lands and honours in more
than one kingdom, frequently making it simple to transfer allegiance from one
king to another. Haemorrhages of political authority, with dramatic results,
were not unknown. In the winter of 858Charles ‘the Bald’ ofWest Francia was
driven out of his realm when his nobles sided with his half-brother Louis ‘the
German’.41Charles’s father, Louis ‘the Pious’, had once been deposed when his
men deserted him for his sons, Lothar, Pippin, and Louis.42 The various
41 Annals of St-Bertin, s.a. 858.
42 Ibid., s.a. 833; Thegan, ‘Life of Louis the Pious’, Carolingian Civilization: A Reader, trans.
Paul Dutton (Peterborough, Ontario, 1996), pp. 141–55; The ‘Astronomer’, ‘Life of
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Carolingians therefore attempted to create armies which they could use as
coercive forces without having to rely on their nobles’ good-will. Probably the
most effective method was the continuing use of Church land. Churches and
monasteries held large estates and, by the appointment of abbots or bishops,
kings could ensure that warriors supported by benefices on ecclesiastical lands
were available to royal armies. During his 866 Lotharingian campaign, Charles
the Bald’s army was described as ‘mostly composed of the bishops’
contingents’.43 Through the ninth century, few churches were exempted
from the military obligations (Charles the Bald apparently granted only one
such immunity; his nephew Louis II of Italy none; the much-maligned Charles
III ‘the Fat’ even altered the privileges of the great abbey of Korvei so that it
furnished troops in cases of emergency).
The ninth-century Carolingians also attempted to ensure that troops were
available for defensive wars through a system first established by
Charlemagne, called the adiutorium (a system of ‘assistance’). This envisaged
a ‘flat rate’ whereby each unit of land of a particular size (or, possibly,
estimate of productivity) furnished one warrior. Charlemagne initially envi-
saged this unit as three mansi (roughly, farms) but soon adopted a lighter
obligation of one warrior from fourmansi (context is provided by the fact that
Charlemagne only expected a holder of twelve mansi to serve in full mail).
Each owner of four mansi was required to provide a warrior (holders of
multiples of this figure would provide one for each group of four). Those
owning less land were grouped together to provide one warrior.
Charlemagne and his successors legislated to ensure that those not serving
in person provided supplies and other logistical equipment (such as carts) for
those who were. Large monastic foundations were crucial. Fines were
regularly (and the death penalty occasionally) envisaged for failure to attend
the muster.44 Whether all this legislation was especially effective is doubtful;
descriptive accounts of campaigns still stress the usual type of army, raised
from royal and aristocratic retinues. Nevertheless, these attempts to impose
general ‘cadastral’ systems of military obligation are important.
Otherwise the Frankish rulers seem, pragmatically, to have focused their
efforts upon ensuring that aristocratic retinues were available when armies
Louis’, in Son of Charlemagne: A Contemporary Life of Louis the Pious, trans. Allen Cabaniss
(Syracuse NY, Syracuse University Press, 1961).
43 Annals of St-Bertin, s.a. 866.
44 Italian Capitulary of 801, ch. 2, 3; Capitulary on Mobilisation for the use of the missi
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were needed, whether for defensive or offensive operations. This was espe-
cially the case in Italy, where, by 866 at least, it was envisaged that anyone
with less than half of the wherewithal to provide a warrior (the bharigild as it
was called) was left behind.45 Although Louis II of Italy never exempted any
churches from military service, he did exempt individual laymen.46 The
Italian Carolingians seem to have lost interest in a general levy in favour of
an army based around the greater royal vassals and churches. At the end of
his reign, Charles II ‘the Bald’, having apparently failed to create a royal army
by other means, fell back on the same sort of system. The king ordered all
great landlords to draw up lists of their own honores and vassals, and how
many mansi they held. These retinues, thus declared, were envisaged to be at
royal disposal.47
The army’s core was provided by the royal bodyguard and, as throughout
the Early Middle Ages, made up of two groups: young warriors serving full-
time in the palace guard and older warriors who had received their lands as
a reward for service and who now attended the guard more intermittently or
as the officers and trainers of younger warriors. The different grades of guard
are described in the later ninth century in Hincmar of Reims’s On the
Governance of the Palace.48
The developments in the Frankish realms (now of course including
Germany and Italy as well as much of the Christian territory in Spain) can
be paralleled in England. Anglo-Saxon kings also began to establish
a cadastral system of military service. The vague indications are that the
rate was envisaged as one man from five (or possibly six) hides (a unit of land
or productivity similar to the mansus). The one-man-to-five-hides rate seems
to have been of general application by the time of Domesday Book. Around the
mid ninth century, the West Saxon king Æthelwulf was apparently con-
cerned to provide lands for the upkeep of his warriors (thegns) from royal
estates and made a generous donation of one-tenth of his lands to the Church
which, some claimed, was exempt from all, including military, duties. No
self-respecting Carolingian would have done this.
Responses to the Vikings
The stimulus for much of the development in the ninth-century systems of
raising armies was provided by attacks on Christian Europe by Scandinavian,
Muslim, and Magyar raiders. Viking armies themselves are dealt with
45 Capitularia Regum Francorum, no. 218.
46 Ludovici II Diplomata, ed. Konrad Wanner (Rome, MGH, 1994), nos. 20, 47, and 35.
47 Annals of St-Bertin, s.a., 869. 48 Carolingian Civilization, pp. 485–99.
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elsewhere in this volume. In many important regards, the Vikings were no
different from any other early medieval Western military forces. Yet, there
does seem to have been something qualitatively different about them.
Religious differences meant that they and their Christian enemies frequently
had different understandings and expectations of the conduct of warfare.
Without shared beliefs, oaths were difficult to underpin with shared super-
natural sanctions. While Christian armies were certainly not above attacking
ecclesiastical establishments, accepted norms of behaviour regarding such
churches and monasteries did not apply to the Vikings. Other features made
the Vikings ‘difficult’. Their armies campaigned all year round (even in
winter) and employed surprise and the exploitation of the Christian calendar.
A further novel and disturbing feature of Viking warfare was its commodi-
fication. Between the fifth century and the ninth, mercenaries are generally
conspicuous by their absence in Western Europe. This is unsurprising in
a largely non-monetary economy where soldiers were rewarded in land. In
these circumstances, the true mercenary, serving for monetary payment for
a defined period and with no necessary ties with his employer after the
termination of the contract, simply could not exist. Alongside ninth-
century economic expansion (in which Viking armies may have played
a part) and the concomitant growth in the use of money, the Scandinavians
seem to have been happy to sell their loyalty and their services to the highest
bidder. This must have shocked Christian contemporaries.
These dangerous, mobile, and unorthodox foes required specific
responses, which we can see on both sides of the Channel. Although the
popular image of the Vikings is of coastal raiders, the great Viking armies
very often travelled, frequently mounted, overland. If not left at the coast,
their accompanying fleets plied the great European river systems. One
important anti-Viking strategy, therefore, was to limit this mobility and this
was especially effectively done by fortifying river-crossings. These not only
barred the rivers to Viking fleets (as barriers, these river crossings are best
envisaged as pontoon bridges), they also denied crossing points to Viking
armies travelling overland. Charles the Bald tried, with mixed success, to
create fortified bridges barring the Loire and the Seine. After finally defeating
the Great Army in 878–9, Alfred of Wessex put into operation a more
extensive and more effective defensive scheme, a network of forts or burhs.
Stationed so that no one in his kingdom lived more than a day’s journey from
such a fort, they were sited to control the nodes of riverine and road
communication networks. When the Viking Great Army returned from
Francia in the 890s, following a defeat by King Arnulf of East Francia, these
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forts proved their worth. The Danes were rapidly compelled to leave Alfred’s
kingdom, hounded by the West Saxon field army.
The other component of Alfred’s defensive scheme was indeed to create
a permanent armed force, using the cadastral system of raising the army that,
as we have seen, was emerging in the ninth century. In England that scheme
seems to have been one warrior from every five hides of land. Alfred arranged
his levy so that they served in two, or perhaps more probably three, rotations.
One contingent would serve with the king, while another stayed at home. It
seems that the third contingent manned the burhs. This schememakes sense as
a demand on the time of the land-owning classes. After their time on their
estates, they would man the forts, remaining close to their lands and able to
manage them if necessary, before leaving the burh and marching as
a contingent to the royal army when the next contingent arrived to relieve
them. After their spell in the field force, they were stood down for a third of
the year, as the next rotation arrived from the burhs to replace them. This
armed force was the basis for the tenth-century West Saxon conquest of the
midlands and the north of England. The successful aggressive warfare added to
the rotating, cadastral basis ofmilitary service, bringing all sorts of landholders –
not just themost powerful – into the king’s presence and offering them chances
to earn rewards in land, office, and patronage, in making the late ninth- and
tenth-century English army the type of royal coercive force not seen in
Western Europe since the sixth century. The burh system was expanded as
the realm grew, these forts being visible marks of royal government on the
local landscape and foci for the performance of the military obligations that
underpinned it.
Across the Channel, analogous attempts to strengthen royal power
through responses to the Viking threat were less successful. Charles the
Bald’s fortified bridges were left incomplete and soon abandoned. Charles
also attempted to use cadastral military obligation to create a royal army.49
Poorer landholders were encouraged to attend the muster and their more
powerful fellows prevented frommolesting themwhen they did so. Yet these
efforts too failed and by the end of his reign Charles had adopted the solution
of his Italian nephew Louis II and acted simply to ensure that aristocratic and
ecclesiastical armed followings were ultimately at his disposal. In another
imaginative attempt to bolster his rule, Charles tried to employ one of the
Viking armies themselves. He would take the fiscal levy raised from across
the realm to pay off the Danes (such as would be known in England as
49 The Edict of Pîtres (above, n. 31).
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Danegeld) but pay it to the Vikings, not to go away but to act in his service,
creating a mercenary force independent of Frankish aristocratic involvement.
Other magnates, Frankish and Breton, had already enlisted the support of
Viking contingents.50 Unfortunately for Charles, the Viking leader he
selected, Weland, was killed by one of his fellow commanders in a personal
duel not long afterwards51 and the plan fizzled out, to be replaced first by his
Edict of Pîtres (Charles’s most elaborate attempt to employ a cadastral
system) and eventually by his move to control military followings.
Tenth-century change
The novel features of Viking warfare and the late ninth-century Christian
responses to it point the way towards developments during the tenth cen-
tury: the employment of foreign mercenaries, the greater use of fortifications
and attempts at cadastrally organised military service. The principal outlines
of tenth-century English military service have already been mentioned. One
important document is the Burghal Hidage of c.918, which sets down
a possibly more systematised version of the reforms established by Alfred
in Wessex. This document tells us that there were 27,000 hides assessed for
military service and the maintenance of the burhs. It envisages one man from
each such hide for service in the fortresses (upkeep and repair and probably
defence in times of attack). The usual ratio of one man per five hides suggests
that this kingdom could furnish a standing army of about 5,500men. Up until
the 950s the English army, like that of the eighth-century Carolingians was
repeatedly in action in successful expansionist warfare, which made it
a difficult foe to beat, as shown by an almost unbroken record of success.
Thereafter, prolonged peace, broken only by smaller-scale punitive raids,
appears (as with the later eighth-century Lombards) to have meant a decline
in the army’s quality and possibly even a tendency to abandon body armour.
These had drastic effects when the kingdom was attacked by the new royal
Danish armies of Swein and Cnut.
As far as the more ambitious attempts to employ external threats as a basis
for increasing royal power was concerned, the baton was taken up by the
new rulers of the East Frankish kingdom, the Ottonians (who revived the
Western Empire when Otto I was crowned emperor in 962). The principal
strategy of the Ottonians, like that of the later ninth-century Carolingians,
was to ensure their control of armed retinues. A document, the indiculus
loricatorum of 981, represents the Ottonians’ attempt to register the greater
50 See, for example, Annals of St-Bertin, s.a., 862. 51 Ibid., s.a. 863.
guy halsall
78
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP-NEW/21997673/WORKINGFOLDER/CURRY-RG/9780521877152C02.3D 79 [50–82] 19.4.2020 9:33PM
landholdings of the realm and how many armoured horsemen (loricati) they
could furnish. This shows that the German rulers could, in theory, call upon
about 20,000 men. It is extremely unlikely for logistical reasons that this sort
of number was ever raised – indeed throughout the Middle Ages these sorts
of lists have a tendency to give inflated views of the numbers of troops
available to royal rulers. Nevertheless, it suggests that when the need arose
the Ottonians ought to have had little difficulty – even if the constraints of
logistics and ‘consensual politics’ cut the numbers to a quarter of all those
theoretically available – in levying a force of armoured horsemen that at least
matched the maximum size of the West Saxon field army envisaged in the
Burghal Hidage. That said, one story suggests that East Frankish armies were
not large. When, in 955, a contingent of fifty horsemen was slaughtered by
the Slavs it was felt that the army had suffered a colossal setback.52
Earlier in the century, the Ottonians had attempted to parallel the
Alfredian response to Viking attack (although the East Franks were much
more concerned with the raids of the Magyars). Henry I ‘the Fowler’ had
tried to create border fortifications in newly cleared lands. Farmers attached
to these works were divided into groups of ten, one of whom was always
present in its garrison.53
However, although the Ottonian kings fought numerous successful for-
eign wars (and some not so successful, such as Otto II’s catastrophic defeat by
the Italian Saracens at Cap Colonne in Italy, in 982), proportionately most of
their military activity during the century was concerned with internal revolt,
by rivals in Franconia, Bavaria, or Lotharingia or by disgruntled members of
their own family (such as Otto I’s brothers Thankmar and Henry, or his son
Liudolf).54 When Otto I’s brother Henry became Duke of Bavaria, the two
problems combined! As elsewhere, in this sort of fighting, royal decrees about
military service were of little value and armies were composed of the retinues
of different factions, in the old way. Another strategy of the Ottonians,
therefore, parallels earlier Carolingian efforts and that is the much-debated
imperial ‘church system’, whereby members of the ruling dynasty were
appointed to particularly powerful bishoprics. Whether this was really
a ‘system’ has rightly been doubted; it could only be an ad hoc response
and it was far from universally successful. Nevertheless, the aim was clear
52 Karl Leyser, ‘The Battle at the Lech, 955: A Study in Tenth CenturyWarfare’,History 50
(1965), 58.
53 Timothy Reuter, Germany in the Early Middle Ages, 800–1056 (London, Longman, 1991),
p. 143.
54 Reuter, Germany in the Early Middle Ages, pp. 70–180.
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enough. In controlling the great bishoprics (and eventually archbishoprics)
the kings would have access to powerful contingents of warriors maintained
from ecclesiastical estates.
What one might term the Alfredian model – the combination of royal
fortress and permanent army – was probably most successfully emulated at
the very end of our period in the newly reunified kingdom of Denmark. Here
King Swein and his son Cnut constructed a series of famous circular, geo-
metric fortresses which housed permanent garrisons (including women and
children). These are to be found outside the political heartlands of the
dynasty and serve a similar purpose to the English burhs as visible marks of
royal presence. Attempts to create a cadastrally organised army are also
visible, which eventually culminated in the Leidang or levy. On another
fringe of Christian Europe, the north of Spain, one can also trace attempts
to impose general military obligations, all the more necessary in the context
of almost perpetual warfare against the amirate, now caliphate, of Cordoba
(in the ninety-two years between 791 and 883, for example, forty wars are
recorded). In the Kingdom of the Asturias this obligation was called fosato or
fonsado. Yet, like the Carolingians, the Asturian kings still granted exemptions
to certain churches, forbidding their military officials – who continued to be
known by the old Gothic term saiones – from entering such estates to levy
troops.
Tenth-century France witnessed no such attempts. Although the once
sharp and teleological outlines of the story have been much nuanced in
recent decades, the history of western Francia in this period can never-
theless still be characterised by dynastic conflict, especially but by no
means exclusively between the Robertians (later the Capetians) and the
last Carolingians, and a steady weakening of effective royal control
throughout the kingdom. At the same time took place the growth of
what Dhondt called the territorial principalities (such as Anjou,
Aquitaine, and Normandy) under their own ruling dynasties.55 The last
Western Carolingians were no ciphers and the story of gradual fragmen-
tation of political power was far from inevitable. Nevertheless, however
one explains them, the outlines of that tale remain the same with the
effective political fragmentation first of the West Frankish kingdom and
then of the territorial principalities themselves. The resulting ‘Feudal
Revolution’ of the decades around 1000 has been endlessly debated and
its very existence called into question but, fortunately for us, we can
55 Jean Dunbabin, France in the Making, 843–1180 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985).
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skirt these tricky issues to some extent by looking at the nature of
armies and warfare, and indeed these can quickly be sketched. The
general unit of military analysis remained, perhaps more than ever
before, the aristocratic retinue, composed of armoured mounted war-
riors. Fortifications were also important but in different ways from those
in England and Denmark. Whatever their origins in defence against
marauders, ‘small forts’ (castella in Latin, whence – obviously – our
word castle) fairly quickly became in practice hereditary, in much the
same way as the honores of which they were the physical foci had
become understood as familial possessions, even if originating in, and
sometimes still legitimised by, royally bestowed titles. These made the
negotiation between local military elites and central authorities (royal or
ducal), so necessary for the summoning of armies even in the earlier era,
that bit more difficult still. Without doubt, just as the Carolingians had
(in many ways very effectively) countered these issues through the
employment of royal ritual and ideology, the fluidity of these relations
was countered by the growing social and cultural (if not legal) concen-
tration on oaths of vassalage and concepts of fealty. Here we are fully in
the world of knights and castles that characterises the central Middle
Ages.
Conclusion
This survey of warfare and military service across four centuries of
Western European history has necessarily had to exclude much, and
with it a great deal of the nuance and variety (I have said nothing of the
distinctive warfare in the so-called ‘Celtic fringe’, for example).
Nevertheless, it can still be seen that this period was neither one of
simple continuity from Rome, nor of the triumph of (probably mythical)
‘Germanic’ warrior cultures. Nor can it be seen as a half-hearted pre-
cursor to the ‘fully formed’ feudalism of the central Middle Ages. There
is a dynamic to be seen in the development of armed forces between
c.600 and c.1000, one which lies in the relationships between central
powers and local, increasingly militarised, elites. The use of military
service to explore this dynamic contributes greatly to the understanding
of early medieval politics. But just as this suggests how military history
has an important place in the comprehension of early medieval politics,
this chapter illustrates clearly, too, how warfare and armies can only be
understood in the broader context of contemporary social and economic
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structures. The warfare of this period also has its own distinctive
characteristics, with a greater emphasis on battle and (at least before
the tenth century) less attention to sieges than in later eras. These
characteristics can only really be explained by study of the economy
and settlement pattern of the period and of the central place – indeed
one that almost excluded alternatives – of military activity in early
medieval society.
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